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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PEARL GREGORY, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 1 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8695 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained by her 
in a train-car collision which occurred at a railroad cross-
ing in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 26, 1955. The 
case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., 
sitting with a jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case 
the defendant moved the court for a directed verdict and 
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for a nonsuit. The motion was granted and the case was 
dismissed. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is in substantial agreement with the state-
ment of facts set forth by plaintiff in her brief so far as 
it goes. The statement does not afford a complete under-
standing of the accident as reconstructed by the plaintiff's 
evidence, however. 
The accident occurred at a railroad crossing near 4th 
West and 4th North Streets in Salt Lake City. Fourth 
North Street is a divided two-lane highway about 40 feet 
wide. At said intersection several of defendant's tracks 
cross in a north-south direction. Just prior to the accident 
plaintiff's automobile was proceeding west on Fourth North 
Street and defendant's locomotive was traveling south on 
the westernmost of several tracks crossing said street. 
Plaintiff's witnesses demonstrated that from a point in 
Fourth North Street approximately 90 feet east of the 
point of impact there was a clear view of the track on which 
the locomotive was traveling for "probably" l/2 a mile to 
the north of the street (R. 23, 24). At a point in the road 
about 190 feet east of the point of impact a traveler could 
see up the westernmost track for about 1,4 to 1;2 of a mile 
if there were no obstructions on the other rails (R. 26, 27). 
Plaintiff sought to show that there were certain standing 
box cars on the rails to the north of the street which would 
partially obstruct the traveler's view of the west track. 
The evidence completely failed to establish a material ob-
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struction, however. A police officer called by plaintiff as 
a witness testified that there were standing cars "several 
hundred feet" to the north of the north line of 4th North 
Street (R. 44, 45). In response to questioning by the court 
this witness said : 
"A. As I recall I walked back up the roadway 
and looked at the point of vision and, as I recall, the 
box cars didn't offer an obstacle as far as the vision 
was concerned." 
His testimony was that immediately after the accident he 
had walked back a little east of the watchman's shanty to 
determine a motorist's view of the track on which the loco-
motive was approaching and found no obstruction to vision 
(R. 47). This shanty is located more than 150 feet east of 
the rail where the accident occurred. It thus appears from 
the plaintiff's own witness that 150 feet east of the point 
of accident a motorist had an unobstructed view to the 
north of the track on which the locomotive was traveling. 
Plaintiff's husband, Marion Gregory, who was driving the 
automobile testified that there were standing box cars on 
the rails two or three tracks east of the rail where the 
accident occurred and about 50 feet north of Fourth North 
(R. 20). With regard to Gregory's view of the western-
most track, he said: (D. 19) 
"Yes sir ; there was some box cars setting down 
there. I wouldn't say it prevented me from seeing 
a train coming on a certain track, but there were 
some box cars there." 
It is thus clear that for many car lengths to the east of 
the point of impact Gregory had an unobstructed view of 
the track on which the locomotive was traveling. 
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The accident occurred on December 26, 1955, at ap-
proximately 11:50 a.m. It was a clear day. The road was 
dry. The train involved was a diesel pulling 27 cars (R. 
52). 
The only eye-witness account of the accident was given 
by Marion Gregory, the driver of the automobile. Gregory 
testified that as he approached the railroad tracks he 
stopped his car (D. 10, 13). He then started up and drove 
a distance of over 100 feet, at a constant speed of three to 
four miles per hour to the point where the train and car 
collided (D. 14, 23, 24). The speed was characterized as 
being comparable to a fast walk. The officer whom plain-
tiff called said that the car at this speed could be stopped 
in about four feet (R. 58). Gregory testified that as he 
approached the easternmost track he heard a diesel engine 
but that, he didn't see a watchman and therefore didn't 
pay any attention to it (D. 9, 10, 13, 14). The physical 
evidence compels the conclusion that the train was in full 
view as Gregory approached the westernmost track. Not-
withstanding this he failed to see the train until it was six 
to ten feet from the car (D. 21). At that time it was too 
late to prevent the accident as the car was either on, or 
right to the edge of the track (D. 21). In answer to coun-
sel's questioning Gregory testified as follows: (D. 15, 16) 
"Q. Now I think you said, not seeing the 
watchman, you assumed it was clear to go, and you 
went on, is that right? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. All right, as you proceeded on west, Mr. 
Gregory, then I think you indicated, in answer to my 
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question about whether you could still hear the 
sound of this Diesel, that that was out of your mind, 
because you didn't see a watchman there, and you 
assumed you could go on. 
"A. I assumed the right-of-way was mine, and 
I was safe. 
"Q. You heard the sound of the Diesel before 
that? 
"A. Before that. 
"Q. And you paid no attention, after you 
started, because there wasn't a watchman there, 
and you figured it was safe to go? 
"A. I figured that was my protection. 
"Q. Well then, as you proceeded to the west, 
did you ever see this particular engine that struck 
your car, prior to the time that it hit it? 
"A. I never seen it before, it seemed to me--
now I want to get as close to it as I can-it was 
between six and eight feet of me, or ten, something 
like that. 
Now listen, a thing like that could be done so 
quick-
"Q. Mr. Gregory, I appreciate and understand 
that very well, and all you can do is give your best 
judgment. 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And you best judgment is that you saw 
this Diesel Engine about six to ten feet, prior to the 
time that it hit you? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And that is the first time that you saw 
it? 
"A. And that is the only time I saw it. 
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"Q. The first and only time you saw it? 
"A. That is right." 
When Gregory saw the engine he threw his head to 
the right directly into the diesel's burning headlight and 
the impact occurred (D. 17). 
Although plaintiff alleged that the train was exceed-
ing the lawful speed limit there was absolutely no evidence 
that it was. Plaintiff also sought to show that no bell or 
whistle was sounded as the train approached the crossing 
but the only evidence even remotely tending to prove these 
allegations was the testimony of Marion Gregory to the 
effect that he could not state whether or not a bell or whistle 
was sounded (D. 17-18). Plaintiff did testify that he ex-
pected to see a watchman if any train was approaching the 
crossing and that he saw no watchman. 
Defendant's motion for directed verdict was grounded 
upon its contention that there was no evidence of actionable 
negligence on the part of the defendant and that plaintiff's 
evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that the negli-
gence of Marion Gregory and of the plaintiff was the sole 
cause of the accident. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
(1) There Was No Evidence That Defendant 
Was Guilty of Actionable Negligence. 
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(2) The Negligence of Marion Gregory and of 
The Plaintiff Was The Sole Cause of The 
Accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
(1) There Was No Evidence That Defendant 
Was Guilty of Actionable Negligence. 
The plaintiff's evidence completely failed to establish 
any negligence on the part of the defendant which could 
have proximately contributed to the accident. 
There was no evidence whatsoever that the train was 
traveling at an excessive speed. Only two witnesses were 
interrogated as to the speed of the locomotive. Marion Greg-
ory replied in response to counsel's question as to how fast 
the locomotive was traveling: 
"I wouldn't begin to try to tell you how fast. 
It might have been running ten mile an hour and it 
might have been running sixty, I don't know (D. 
26) ." 
The police officer who investigated the accident was un-
able to state from the physical evidence how fast the train 
had been traveling before the impact. There was no show-
ing whatever that the train was traveling at an excessive 
rate of speed. As a matter of fact there was no evidence 
from which the jury could have made a finding as to speed. 
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In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is to be 
presumed that the train was traveling at a safe and rea-
sonable speed and was not exceeding the lawful speed limit. 
Counsel for plaintiff urges in their brief that there was 
evidence from which the jury could have found that the 
defendant negligently failed to sound a whistle or a bell 
as it approached the crossing. The only testimony bearing 
on this issue was offered by Marion Gregory, the driver of 
the car. His testimony was as follows: (D. 17, 18) 
"A. I wouldn't say I could hear the bell ring-
ing or anything. 
"Q. Would you say, Mr. Gregory, the bell 
wasn't ringing? 
"A. No, I wouldn't say it was, nor I wouldn't 
say it wasn't. 
"Q. Did you hear any sound of a whistle? 
"A. No sir, there wasn't any whistle blowed 
I didn't think. 
* * * * * 
"I am not going to be positive; I am not going 
to say something I didn't know. 
* * * * * 
"Q. Would you say Mr. Gregory that such a 
whistle was not blown? 
"A. No sir, I wouldn't. I wouldn't say it 
wasn't; I wouldn't say it was." 
The plaintiff who was actually closer to the locomotive 
than Mr. Gregory offered no testimony whatsoever with 
regard to the bell or whistle. It is submitted that the testi-
mony of Gregory is not substantial enough to support a 
finding by the jury that the defendant failed to sound a 
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bell or whistle. We think this is particularly true in view 
of the fact that Gregory admitted that as he approached the 
point of impact he was not particularly paying attention 
to the noises about him (D. 9). As a matter of fact after 
Gregory had stopped his automobile just east of the east-
ernmost track, he heard the sound of a diesel motor but 
paid no attention to this sound as he started up and pro-
ceeded west on Fourth North (D. 9) . He further testified 
that because the road looked clear the sound of the diesel 
which he had heard left his mind (D. 10). This case is 
similar to that of Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company, 59 Utah 366, 204 Pac. 101, where a judgment 
for the plaintiff was reversed, the court holding that nega-
tive testimony as to the failure of the defendant railroad 
to ring a bell was insufficient to support a finding of no 
warning. The court there said : 
"This is not a case in which the witness claims 
to have been listening for signals and failed to hear 
them." 
From the earlier decisions of this court it appears clear 
that negative testimony of the character involved in the 
instant case has no probative value whatsoever unless it 
appears from the testimony of the witness that he was 
actually listening for warning sounds and that he was 
actually paying attention to what occurred. Jensen v. Ore-
gon Short Line Railroad Company, supra; Clark v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 70 Utah 29, 257 Pac. 1050; 
Anderson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 76 Utah 
324, 289 Pac. 146. In the later case of Hudson v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 120 Utah 245, 233 P. 2d 357, 
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this court stated that the test is whether under all of the 
circumstances the "warnings would have awakened [the 
witness'] attention to them." It is manifest from the plain-
tiff's own testimony that he was oblivious to the noises 
about him and that he was blindly relying upon the absence 
of a watchman as assurance that there were no approaching 
trains. He was very frank to state that a whistle might 
have been sounded and that a bell might have been rung 
and that he was in no position to state that no whistle was 
sounded or that no bell was rung. We submit that such a 
feebl~ showing is not substantial evidence which would 
support a finding by the jury. 
It is next contended by counsel that plaintiff's evidence 
would have supported a finding by the jury that the rail-
road failed to maintain a proper lookout for the approach 
of motor vehicles. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
the engineer of the locomotive was not looking for approach-
ing traffic or that he did not see the plaintiff's automobile. 
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the operator of the 
defendant's locomotive had a legal right to assume that the 
plaintiff's automobile, which was traveling at a rate of 
three to four miles per hour would stop short of the track 
on which the locomotive was traveling and yield the lawful 
right of way. The automobile could have been stopped in 
four feet. The train with its 27 cars required 612 feet to 
come to a stop after the impact. 
This court was confronted with an identical problem 
in the case of Van Wagoner, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 112 Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293, where the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant's train operators failed to keep 
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a proper lookout. Plaintiff's counsel excepted to the trial 
court's refusal to submit the issue to the jury. In dealing 
with this contention, the court said: 
"* * * While both objects were approach-
ing the crossing the crew was entitled to assume the 
truck would stop until such time as a reasonably 
prudent person would know otherwise. Under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, a failure to act 
in time to avoid a collision does not establish a fail-
ure to look. 
"Even were we to assume the train crew failed 
to keep a proper lookout, appellants must still fail 
in their assignment, as assuming the truck was 
stalled for a couple of seconds ; if it is intended to 
submit this question to the jury, there must be a 
basis for concluding that the failure to keep a 
lookout proximately contributed to the accident. 
* * * Assuming that when the truck stalled, as 
testified to by Miss Bowers, and this would be the 
first opportunity the train crew would have of 
knowing it was stalled, and assuming further that 
the engineer saw the truck, could the jury reasonably 
have found that the collision would have been 
avoided? Not unless there was sufficient time for 
the train crew to have stopped the train or, assum-
ing the warning signals not to have been given, to 
permit these signals to have been given and the 
deceased to have been warned in time to have 
jumped clear of the train. A fair reading of the 
evidence warrants a finding by the trial court that 
regardless of whether or not the train crew was 
keeping a lookout, this could not have been a proxi-
mate cause of the collision. Because of the weight 
of the train, the impossibility of turning to avoid 
objects in its path, the same right of way rule does 
not apply as in the case of two automobiles. Trains 
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cannot be stopped in time to avoid collisions if the 
time interval is shortened to a matter of two sec-
onds, and warnings are of no avail if they cannot 
be given in time to permit a person to escape from 
his position of peril." 
Even assuming a failure to keep a proper lookout, this 
could not, as demonstrated, have been a proximate cause of 
the accident. The final alleged act of negligence on the part 
of the railroad was the failure to provide a watchman to flag 
down approaching traffic. There is no common law duty 
imposed upon railroads to maintain watchmen at all cross-
ings. Under certain exceptional circumstances where con-
ditions of extreme danger exist, it has been held that rail-
road companies must maintain either a watchman or pro-
vide other suitable warning devices. There is no showing, 
however, from the facts of the instant case that there was 
any unusual or extreme danger involved in the crossing 
which is the subject of this action. It was broad daylight 
at the time of the accident. There were no substantial 
obstructions to the vision of motorists either to the south 
or to the north of the crossing. There was nothing about 
the physical arrangement which might be confusing to a 
motorist. In fact the only other equipment of which the 
witnesses were aware was a few standing box cars located 
north of the intersection and two or three tracks east of 
the rail on which the locomotive was approaching. It is 
firmly established in this jurisdiction that railroad tracks 
are in themselves a warning of danger. In addition to this, 
plaintiff's evidence clearly establishes that there were 
appropriate signs posted at the approach to the crossing, 
and plaintiff himself testified that he was "very familiar" 
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with the crossing and knew that he had to cross several 
tracks. He did testify that he had seen watchmen at the 
crossing on prior occasions but this would cerainly not 
justify or explain the conduct of Gregory as he traveled 
obliviously into the path of the heavy locomotive. If by 
some stretch of the imagination it be held that under the 
circumstances of this case the failure of the defendant to 
maintain a watchman was negligence, still it is clear that 
such negligence did not proximately contribute to the acci-
dent. It is undisputed that Gregory stopped his car at the 
east rail where the watchman would have been. He then 
started his car and traveled approximately 150 feet from 
the point where the watchman would have been to the 
point where the accident occurred. His negligence in fail-
ing to maintain a proper lookout as he approached the acci-
dent site was an independent and efficient cause of the 
accident. We certainly do not concede that the railroad had 
a duty to maintain a watchman at this crossing, but in any 
event, even if there was such a duty, any antecedent negli-
gence on the part of the railroad in failing to maintain a 
watchman at a point 150 feet east of the accident site was 
not a direct and proximate cause of the accident. Under 
the circumstances of this case the absence of a watchman 
bears only on the issue of the negligence of the motorist. 
It is no justification whatsoever for the failure of Gregory 
to look and to see the approaching locomotive. 
We submit that there was no evidence offered by the 
plaintiff from which the jury could have found that defen-
dant was guilty of actionable negligence. 
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(2) The Negligence of Marion Gregory and of 
The Plaintiff Was The Sole Cause of The 
Accident. 
That Marion Gregory was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law is too clear for labored argument. Plaintiff's 
evidence conclusively shows that as Gregory approached 
the west rail of the crossing he had an unobstructed view 
in the direction in which the defendant's locomotive was 
traveling for a distance of 14 to l/2 mile. Yet he failed to 
see the approaching train until it was too late to prevent 
the accident. He admits that he heard a diesel engine when 
he was over 100 feet from the accident site and yet he paid 
no particular attention to it. When the locomotive was six 
to ten feet away he said it made a "loud noise" and sounded 
like a "cyclone" (D. 16, 17). His awareness of the sound 
of the locomotive came too late, however, to prevent the 
accident. Since counsel for plaintiff concedes the negli-
gence of Marion Gregory in their brief, we will not lengthen 
this argument with an analysis of the cases pertinent to the 
issue of his negligence. Suffice it to say that he clearly 
failed to look and• listen as he approached the crossing or 
failed to heed what he heard and saw and was in this regard 
negligent as a matter of law. Benson v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 
2d 790; Nuttall v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; Wilkinson v. 0. S. L. 
Ry. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 Pac. 466; Abdulkadir v. The West-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339. 
Even if it be assumed, contrary to the evidence and to 
the facts, that the defendant failed to warn of the approach 
of the locomotive by watchmen, whistle or bell, still the 
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conduct of Gregory in driving obliviously into the path of 
the locomotive is not any less the cause of the accident. In 
this regard the court's statement in Holmgren v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 114 Utah 262, 198 P. 2d 459, is 
pertinent: 
"The failure of the blinker signal to warn 
Holmgren of the approaching train was not an in-
vitation for him to proceed blindly across the tracks 
* * *" 
See also Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903, where a signal bell was not 
operating. To the same effect is Nuttall v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 
15, where it was said : 
"Before a motorist can be justified in making 
any assumption that signals will be given or that 
the train will be operated at a lawful speed he must 
first slow up, listen for signals, and look attentively 
up and down the track. 'If * * * by looking, 
[he] could have seen an approaching train in time 
to escape, it will be presumed, * * * either 
that he did not look, or, if he did look, that he did 
not heed what he saw.' " 
We think that the negligence of Gregory in driving his 
automobile in clear view of the locomotive directly into the 
path of danger was the sole cause of the accident. The 
defendant was not required by law nor could it reasonably 
have been expected to foresee such conduct on the part of 
1.! the defendant. The rationale of the decision of this court 
il in Haarstrich v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100, 
nll 
{lj seems to us to be controlling in the instant case. In the 
~- Haarstrich case plaintiff was a guest in an automobile 
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which collided at nighttime with a train at a railroad cross-
ing on Beck Street. Plaintiff's evidence was that the de-
fendant failed to sound appropriate warnings by blowing 
a whistle, ringing a bell, providing a switchman or even 
having a light on the car of the train. The driver of the 
car did not see the train until it was 13 to 15 feet away. 
In ruling that the negligence of the driver of the automo-
bile was the sole proximate cause of the accident, this 
court said: 
"The street lights were functioning, and there 
appears to have been no reason whatever why he 
could not have stopped his car and avoided the col-
lision if he had looked ahead and applied his brakes 
at the proper time. In view of the indubitable facts 
disclosed by the evidence, it is wholly immaterial 
whether the defendant strictly complied with the 
law as to warnings and signals. Its failure in that 
regard, * * * had nothing whatever to do with 
the accident and was in no sense the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury." 
Under the facts of the instant case, it was broad day-
light. The train was actually 15 feet onto the crossing at 
the time of the impact. As in the H aarstrich case, there is 
no reason why Gregory could not have seen the locomotive 
had he only looked. As a matter of fact the evidence is that 
he did hear the diesel locomotive several yards back from 
the point of accident and yet paid no attention to it. 
We submit that the evidence compels the conclusion 
that Gregory's negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. 
In further support of the trial court's ruling, we submit 
that even if it be held that there was evidence from which 
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a jury would have found negligence on the part of the 
railroad which was a proximate cause of the accident, the 
plaintiff is still not entitled to recover as she was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
The evidence is clear that Gregory did not see the de-
fendant's locomotive until it was eight to ten feet from 
his automobile and even at that time his awareness of the 
train was not brought to his attention by any warning 
given by the plaintiff. Plaintiff was sitting in the front seat 
of the automobile. It is undisputed, as heretofore pointed 
out, that the plaintiff had an unobstructed view of the 
approaching train when the driver still had ample oppor-
tunity to prevent the accident had he been aware of the 
locomotive's approach. As a matter of fact the plaintiff 
probably had a better view to the north as she was sitting 
on the north side of the automobile. It also appears mani-
fest from the testimony of Marion Gregory that the train 
was making a "loud noise" and that it sounded like a "cy-
clone" as it moved into the automobile, yet no warning 
was offered by the plaintiff that an approaching train had 
e been seen or heard. 
Although a passenger in an automobile does not have 
J\ the same duty as the driver in listening and maintaining 
a lookout, it has been established in this jurisdiction that 
the passenger owes at least some duty to exercise care in 
~~ warning of manifest dangers which are or should be ap-
~: parent at railroad crossings. In this regard we cite the 
case of Lawrence v. Denver and Rio Grande Railway Com-
!~ pany, 52 Utah 414, 174 Pac. 817. Although later decisions 
~~ have made inroads on the rationale of the Lawrence case, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
we think the holding of that case is particularly appropriate 
to the facts of the case at bar. In ruling that the plaintiff 
passenger was guilty of contributqry negligence as a matter 
of law in failing to warn the driver of an approaching train 
the presence of which the court said the guest should have 
been aware, Justice McCarty stated: 
"Assuming for the sake of argument, but not 
conceding, that plaintiff was merely the guest of 
Bird, and was in no sense responsible for the man-
ner in which Bird operated and managed the auto-
mobile while making the trip in question, it never-
theless was incumbent upon him to exercise ordinary 
care and prudence by making diligent use of his 
senses of sight and hearing, by looking and listening 
for trains as the automobile approached the crossing, 
and to heed the warnings and signals of the approach 
of the train, and to suggest to Bird that they stop 
until the danger was over, and to protest if that 
was not done. (Citing Cases.) " 
This principle should have application, where, as in the 
instant case, the proximity of a train is so manifestly ap-
parent and yet constitutes such an immediate hazard. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that plaintiff introduced no evidence prov-
ing or tending to prove that the railroad was guilty of 
actionable negligence and that the undisputed evidence 
shows as a matter of law that the negligence of Marion 
Gregory and of the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident, or in any event that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence. The judgment of dismissal 
should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Clifford L. Ashton, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Grant Macfarlane, Jr., 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah. 
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